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THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION IN FEDERAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTIONS
GILBERT SANDLER
The author is a senior law student at Columbia University School of law.
The article examines the role of the presumption (that knowledge of illegal importation, and the
importation itself, of narcotics may be inferred from possession of narcotics) in federal narcotics cases
and questions the constitutional applicability of the presumption to cases involving conspirators and
accessories.-EDnoR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal narcotics regulation consists of several
statutes designed to restrict the international flow
of narcotics as well as their domestic production
and distribution. The Narcotic Drugs Import &
Export (Jones-Miller) Act' generally forbids any
unauthorized dealings in imported opium and coca
leaves. The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act heavily
taxes all coca and opium products regardless of
their source with strict regulations imposed upon
the handling of all narcotics. This legislation was
designed to decrease addiction by limiting the
amount of available narcotics to that which was
necessary for scientific and medicinal purposes.
3
These two acts form the nucleus of the federal
program .
4
Many, if not most, narcotics prosecutions are
undertaken by virtue of the authority of the Jones-
Miller Act, which reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
"Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports
or brings any narcotic drug into the United
121 U.S.C.A. §§171 et seq., 35 Stat. 614, c. 100
(1909). This was amended in 1922 to prohibit the im-
portation of prepared opium, previously unrestricted,
permitting the importation of only crude opium and
coca leaves; the Federal Narcotics Control Board was
also established while the penalties were increased to a
maximum of twenty years of imprisonment. 42 Stat.
596, c.202.2Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Secs. 4701 et seq., derived
from 38 Stat. 785-89 (1914). The tax is 1% per ounce.
All who deal in any way with narcotics must register,
obtain and fill out forms, and place and retain tax
stamps on packages containing narcotics. An exception
is provided for drugs administered to bona-fide patients
by physicians or under prescription from physicians;
but doctors and druggists must keep records of all dis-
positions. The Act has been amended several times in
particulars not here relevant.
3 See Prosser, The Narcotics Problen, 1 U.C.L.A. L.
Rav. 405, 472-75 (1954).
4 Id. at 476. Additionally, the Opium Poppy Control
Act, 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 188 (1942), narrowly restricts
the production of opium to that quantity necessary for
scientific use; the Marihuana Tax Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §
States or any territory under its control or
jurisdiction, contrary to law, or receives, con-
ceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the
transportation, concealment, or sale of any
such narcotic drug after being imported or
brought into the United States contrary to law,
or conspires to commit any of such acts in
violation of the laws of the United States shall
be imprisoned not less than 5 nor more than 20
years, and, in addition, may be fined not more
than $20,000.2'
The key enforcement provision, as well as the
subject of this article, is the following statutory
presumption:
"Whenever on trial for a violation of this
section the defendant is shown to have or to have
had possession of the narcotic drug, such pos-
session shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction unless the defendant ex-
plains the possession to the satisfaction of the
jury."
6
An identical presumption flows from the possession
of marihuana,7 heroin,8 and smoking opium in
transit In addition, all smoking opium is rebut-
tably presumed to be illegally imported, 0 and
anyone who manufactures opium products has the
burden of proving a license to do so." A presump-
tion similar to that of the Jones-Miller Act flows
from possession of narcotics in any form other than
in the original tax-stamped package, in order to
facilitate enforcement of the Harrison Act.u
Some insight into the intended effect of this pre-
2599 (1937), taxes the transfer of marihuana at the
rate of $1.00 per ounce and $100 per ounce for those
dealers who have not registered with the Board.
5 21 U.S.C. § 174.
6 Ibid.
721 U.S.C. §176(a).
8 21 U.S.C. § 176(b).
9 21 U.S.C. §178.
10 21 U.S.C. §181.
1121 U.S.C. §188(m).
12 ITrr. R v. CODE of 1954, sec. 4704(a).
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sumption is provided by its legislative history. It
was first drafted on July 7, 1866 by a conference
committee convened to settle differences between
House and Senate bills, both entitled "An Act
Further to Prevent Smuggling and for Other Pur-
poses.""3 The original bill 4 had instructed that
"the burden of proof shall be upon the claimant
where probable cause is shown for such prosecu-
tion, to be judged by the court."' 5 This was inter-
preted by its critics to violate the traditional pre-
sumption of innocence in all criminal prosecutions
by authorizing the direction of a guilty verdict
upon mere proof of suspicious circumstances (prob-
able cause).Xe Proponents of this shift in the burden
of proof replied that conviction by operation of
law was justified by the necessities of effective law
enforcement, for skillful defense counsel might
require the government to prove the impossible,
i.e., an illegal source or knowledge of the same, and
jury convictions based on circumstantial evidence
would be too infrequent. 7 Nevertheless, an amend-
ment striking out the provision was passed,"' a
presumption substantially identical to that under
consideration was drafted and approved,19 and it
was enacted on July 17, 1866.2" Although at least
one voice objected to this alleged presumption of
guilt from possession, its insertion into the 1909
Act was approved without serious consideration."
II. OPERATIVE EFFECT OF T PRESUMPTION
Prior to a discussion of the effect of this presump-
tion, it should be noted that the source of Congres-
sional authority for narcotics regulation under the
Jones-Miller Act is its power to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce.n Likewise, the constitu-
tional source of the Harrison Act is the tax power."
But Congress may not legislate for the general
welfare, as by prescribing the mislabelling of drugs
not in interstate commerce;24 nor may it infringe
the police power of the states by making mere
" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3501 (1866).
14 Sen. 222.
" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3420.
16 Ibid.
'7 Id. at pp. 3441-42.
8 Ibid.
19 Id. at p. 3803.
20 Id. at p. 3854.
"143 CONG. REc. 1683 (1909).
"2 U. S. CONST., art. I, sec. 8.
" Ibid.
24 Med-A-Dent Co. v. L. D. Caulk Co., 4 F.2d 126
(D.Del. 1925).
possession a crime without focusing on the inter-
state or foreign elements.2 5 Thus, constitutional
difficulties can only be avoided by not allowing the
operation and effect of the presumption section to
render possession itself a criminal act.
2 6
The essential elements of the crime charged by
a Jones-Miller prosecution are: (1) participation in
some manner in a transaction involving narcotics;
(2) unlawful importation of the narcotics; (3)
defendant's knowledge of such illegal source."
Proof of all three components is necessary for the
establishment of a prima facie case. The provision
in question creates either a double presumption of
illegal importation and knowledge of the same,"
or a single presumption that one in possession has
performed every element of the crime." This
presumption is rebuttable and permissive, since
its primary effect is to carry the case to the jury
and to allow them to convict if they so choose. 3
Moreover, the presumption of innocence operates
in a defendant's favor until overcome by proof of
" United States v. Ah Hung, 243 Fed. 762, 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1917): "The charge of unlawful importation
is therefore necessary to take the case out of the or-
dinary police regulation of a state." See also the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Butler in Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 426 (1928): "Mere purchase or
possession of morphine is not a crime. Congress has
not attempted and has no power to make either an
offense..." The majority, upholding the validity of
the Harrison Act, did not contradict this latter state-
ment, but found that possession justified an inference
of violation of the tax provisions. See also United States
v. Jim Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916).
2" Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 848 (10th
Cir. 1962).
VIbid.
2 Copperthwaite v. United States, 37 F.2d 846 (6th
Cir. 1930); Comment, Narcotics Regudation, 62 YALE
L. J. 751, 768 (1953).
2Jackson v. U.S., 250 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir. 1957).
But note that possession itself is not an essential deement
of the crime. Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 111
F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1940). Thus, lawful or uncon-
scious possession is innocent. Ezzard v. United States,
7 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1925). 1 WHARTON, CRIMNAL
EVIDENCE, § 90, p. 176 (12th ed. 1931).
"1 Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 Tu.. L.
REv. 178, 198 (1931); Comment, 38 MicH. L. REv. 366,
369 (1940). Professor Brosman bases this conclusion
on the notion that the jury may always refuse to con-
vict unless the prosecution has proved guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, as well as the fact that the defendant
is protected from a directed verdict and actual compul-
sion to testify. Id. at 197.
Professor Glanville Williams, however, would call
such a presumption of law which requires the accused
to prove a specific issue to the satisfaction of the jury,
a "compelling presumption," if it shifts the burden of
persuasion. Williams, Burdens and Presumptions in
Criminal Law, 212. L. T. 211 (1951).
WVoI 57
NARCOTICS PRESUMPTION
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3' Thus, the pre-
sumption merely shifts the burden of going for-
ward, rather than the burden of persuasion,n and
prescribes a rule of evidence rather than one of
substantive law.- Nor is the prosecution relieved of
its burden of proving guilt.34 The prosecution can,
however, fulfill its burden with circumstantial
evidence, i.e. facts from which the jury may rea-
sonably infer guilt.3" The presumption merely
tells the jury that the fact proved is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to authorize conviction.
36
It manifests legislative approval of a jury's finding
that one fact exists when another is proved, and
assures that, if the proved fact exists, the verdict
will stand.n Since the accused remains immune
from a directed verdict, he may not be seriously
disadvantaged when ordinary reasonable in-
ferences sufficient to support conviction are
regularized into a statutory presumption.P Indeed,
such a presumption may benefit the unwary de-
fendant by notifying him of the circumstances
which raise sufficient suspicion in order that he may
come forward and reconcile such circumstances
with innocence.n
Where, then, lies the great administrative value
of this presumption which has induced its frequent
legislative adoption? First, it insulates the pro-
secution from a directed verdict when elements of
its prima facie case, i.e. illegal importation and
knowledge of such source, are extremely difficult
of proof.40 Also, it may erase doubts of a jury as to
31 Ng Choy Fong v. United States, 245 Fed. 305,
(9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 245 U.S. 669 (1918); Shep-
ard v. United States. 236 Fed. 73 (9th Cir. 1916).
32 Professor Williams would prefer to so construe
statutory presumptions, for to shift the burden of per-
suasion would destroy the traditional presumption of
innocence. His view that such presumptions are merely
evidential is in apparent conflict with that of the Eng-
lish Court of Criminal Appeals. Williams, supra n. 30
at 212-13. See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 63 (1956).
n Velasquez v. United States, 244 F.2d 416 (10th
Cir, 1957); Ng Choy Fong v. United States, supra n. 31
at 307.
' 110 U. PA. L. Rav. 903, 904 (1962).
35 Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Pre-
sunm plions, 55 COL. L. REv. 527, 545 (1955). For a
general comparison between direct and circumstantial
evidence, as well as the view that the latter is at least
as reliable as the former, see Note, Sufficiency of Cir-
cumstantial Evidence in a Criminal Case, 55 COL. L.
REv. 549 (1955).
36 Comment, 38 MIcH. L. Rav. 366, 373 (1940).
37Id. at 369.
8 Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Pre-
sumiptions, supra n. 35 at 546.
n Williams, supra n. 30.40Brosman, supra n. 30 at 203.
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence when
the facts proved indicate guilt but may not clearly
satisfy the elusive criterion of reasonable doubt.
4'
Moreover, the mere mention of the presumption in
the jury charge may influence it,42 both by empha-
sizing the fact proved and its probable conse-
quences, and by the very fact that the legislature
saw fit to enact the rule. Additionally, it permits
convictions to stand which might otherwise be
reversed for insufficient evidence, since the court
cannot set aside a verdict if the presumption is
operative. 43 Finally, the degree of difficulty of
rebuttal of the presumption may dictate the fre-
quency of convictions."
In order to effectively rebut this "presumption
of guilt,' 45 a defendant need only, in theory,
satisfy the jury that either (1) the narcotics in
question were not illegally imported, or (2) that
he had no knowledge of that fact. He is not
required to take the stand to deny knowledge and
submit to a test of credibility.41 If this were neces-
sary, it might violate the privilege of the accused
against self-incrimination since the inherent in-
ference of guilt flowing from his silence would
induce him either to incriminate or perjure him-
self. Nor should the defendant be forced to rely
exclusively on the former method of defense by
proving that his possession was lawful, though the
cases here are in conflict.e This requirement would
be impossible to satisfy where either the narcotics
were contraband or defendant-was a mere tool and
41 Id. at 204; McCormick, Charges on Presumptions
and Burden of Proof, 5 N. C. L. REv. 291, 302-03
(1927). Professor McCormick doubts that the ordinary
jury could systematically weigh the circumstantial
evidence of guilt against the presumption of innocence
resulting in the reasonable doubt standard when judges
have such great difficulty in such cases; the presumption
and instruction thereon alleviates this mystery to a
great degree.
4 Supra n. 36 at 375-76.
41 Ibid.; 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 903,904 (1962); Brosman,
supra n. 30 at 205.
41 Brosman, supra n. 30 at 203. When the difficulty
of rebuttal as manifested by an extraordinarily high
percentage of convictions becomes too great, the effect
of the presumption may be to render the mere fact of
possession criminal, raising constitutional problems. Id.
at 203-04.
41 United States v. Johnson, 260 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959).
41 Perez v. United States, 297 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1961),
reversing a conviction for smuggling marihuana under
21 U.S.C. § 176(a) for the trial court's failure to
charge that defendant need not personally testify in
order to explain his possession. Cf. Knapp v. United
States. 311 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1962), rehearing denied
316 F.2d 744 (1963).
47 In United States v. Turner, 65 F.2d 587 (2d Cir.
1933), a charge that defendant's denial of knowledge
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actually had no knowledge of their source; the
result would be the creation of a new federal crime
of possession.48 However sufficient an honest
denial of knowledge should be for rebuttal pur-
poses, the broad legislative objective would be
thwarted if every participant in narcotics trans-
actions were shielded from punishment by ig-
norance. Although mere negligence is insufficient
to charge the accused with knowledge, an essential
element of the crime, "willful ignorance" or a
"cconscious purpose to avoid enlightenment,"
should serve as a valuable test. Thus, an inter-
mediary in several narcotics transactions could not
credibly plead honest or ordinarily negligent
ignorance, 50 while absolute liability is averted. 51
It has been said that "When credible evidence
was legally insufficient for discharge of his statutory
burden required a showing of lawful importation was
held reversible error. In United States v. Moe Liss,
105 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1939), the second circuit conceded
that lack of knowledge would constitute a valid defense,
yet upheld a charge requiring a showing of "possession
lawful under the statute." Id. at 146. The conviction
could have been affirmed and the charge characterized
as harmless error had the court wished to follow Turner,
since it found defendant's explanation to have indicated
"guilty knowledge." Ibid. Turner was distinguished on
the ground that its sole reversible error was the with-
drawal of the case from the jury. Ibid. This distinction
appears invalid, however, in view of the fact that the
accused in Turner had never attempted to show lawful
possession. If that part of the charge requiring such a
showing were not objectionable, any error would have
been harmless and the conviction affirmed.
Further evidence that "possession lawful under the
statute" did not include innocent possession is provided
by United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945). There the court followed its dictum in Hoe Liss
by refusing to require disclosure of the names of in-
formers establishing defendant's possession. Although,
arguably, the informer's testimony could aid in estab-
lishing the credibility of defendant's denial of knowl-
edge, such disclosure was held valueless to defendant
since the fact of possession "left him with the burden of
coming forward with proof that he possessed the nar-
cotics lawfully." Id. at 652. Accord, United States v.
Feinberg. 123 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
Feinberg v. United States, 315 U.S. 801 (1942); United
States v. Kapsalis, 313 F.2d 875 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
Robinson v. United States, 374 U.S. 856 (1963) (denial
of knowledge, though credible inasmuch as chief prose-
cution witness conceded strong possibility that narcot-
ics were domestically produced, held legally insuffi-
cient).
However, the tenth circuit has recently chosen to
follow Turner. Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845
(10th Cir. 1962). The ninth circuit has indicated its
approval. Bradford v. United States, 271 F.2d 58 (9th
Cir. 1959) (dictum). See also 110 U. PA. L. Rxv. 903,
907, n. 25 (1962).
43 See n. 44, supra.
4 Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th
Cir. 1962).
10 See Bradford v. United States, 271 F.2d 58 (9th
Cir. 1959).
51Although absolute liability may be imposed for
is admitted, the statutory presumption ceases
to operate and the fact which would have been
presumed must be established by the evidence."' '
Although a defendant need not prove lawful
possession, his explanation of possession or denial
of knowledge must be believed by the jury, whose
finding is accorded much weight. Thus, where
defendant's operations were suspicious,N or his
testimony contradicted,N convictions were af-
firmed notwithstanding pleas of ignorance. Al-
though the statutory presumption may vanish
upon the production of rebuttal evidence, a
valid inference may remain based on the circum-
stantial force of the facts proved. 5  The jury may,
and often does, disbelieve the defendant's denial;
though he has met his burden of going forward,
the jury draws logical inferences from the fact of
possession. 56 Moreover, the standard of credibility
is high.7 From this point of view, the presumption
itself is not given evidential value; rather the fact
proved is accorded such effect.-
It is uncertain, however, that in each instance
of conviction despite attempted rebuttal, the jury
the fact of violation of "public welfare" offenses, i.e.
liquor laws, pure food and drug laws, traffic laws, the
severity of the penalty in these narcotics prosecutions
(twenty years imprisonment plus $20,000 fine) resists
their classification with that sphere in which inens rea
is no longer necessary. See Sayre, Public Welfare Of-
fenses, 33 CoL. L. REv. 55, 70-72 (1933).
5 WHARTON, op cit. supra n. 30.
5 United States v. Gibson, 310 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1962); Caudillo v. United States, 253 F.2d 515 (9th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, Romero v. United States, 357
U.S. 931 (1958).54Landsborough v. United States, 168 F.2d 486 (6th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948).
5 5 McComncK, EvEN C § 311 (1954).
66 Walker v. United States, 285 F.2d 52 (5th Cir.
1960); 40 Tex. L. Rev. 287 (1961); Caudillo v. United
States, supra n. 53 at 518.
57 In United States v. Norton, 310 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1962), defendant testified positively that he thought
the narcotics were produced in New York or California
and additionally explained his possession by giving the
name of his source. The court affirmed his conviction
because he had read about the illegal importation of
heroin from Italy and had not further corroborated his
rebuttal by establishing the existence and identity of
his source. Id. at 718-19. Is there a real difference be-
tween requiring the accused to prove a possession law-
ful under the statute and permitting the jury to require
specific identification of the source of the narcotics?
Compare United States v. Moe Liss, supra n. 47 with
the Norton case, supra. Perhaps the jury has greater
discretion in the latter case, but the difficulty of rebut-
tal appears as great.
53 Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16
So. CAL. L. Rv. 245, 263 (1943); Note, Constitutional-
ity of Rebuttable Statutory Presumptions, supra n. 35 at
530. See, generally, McBaine, Presumptions: Are They
Evidence? 26 CAL. L. REv. 519 (1958).
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is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused actually knew that the narcotics had been
illegally imported." It is probable that many
narcotics offenders can testify truthfully that they
had no knowledge of unlawful importation, for
they were not concerned with the primary source
of the narcotics. 0 Conviction of such intermedi-
aries would be impossible under a literal reading
of the statute, but is authorized by judicial ex-
pansion of "knowledge" to include "willful ig-
norance."'" A narrow construction would limit the
force of the statute to primary sources of import
traffic and is unsupported by the broad purpose of
the act as manifested by its comprehensive
language.62 Though the greater the difficulty of
rebuttal, the more often possession itself is pun-
ished,O the result of this construction is merely a
partial relaxation of the mens rea requirement.8'
Perhaps justification for this relaxation may be
found, as in the case of manslaughter and other
crimes of negligence, in the great danger to
innocent members of society and the creation of
a penal deterrent to recklessness, 5 although
many intermediaries affected by this construction
are addicts who act under compulsion and are
themselves the victims of the criminal acts. 6
II. CONSTITUTIoNAL LIMITATIONS
The constitutionality of the presumption is
well-settled.8 ' The primary basis for this con-
0 See 40 Tzx. L. Rlv. 287, discussing Walker v.
United States, supra n. 56, and concluding that convic-
tions in the face of honest denials are the product of
insufficient rational connection between possession and
actual knowledge of the source.
60 Griego v. United States, supra n. 49.
61 Ibid. See also text accompanying n. 49.
6221 U.S.C. §174, quoted supra at p. 7. This
should dispel the view created by preceding sections
and the title of the act that it was solely concerned with
importation and exportation of narcotics. The act was
born of international conferences which resolved to
curb narcotics traffic in general. See 43 CONG. RFc.
supra n. 21.
63 See n. 44, supra.
64 See n. 51, supra.
65 Cf. Hall, Negligent Behavior Slundd Be Excluded
From Penal Liability, 63 COL. L. REV. 632, 636-42
(1963).
66 Arguably, however, this broad construction helps
to prevent the expansion of addiction to the uninitiated,
an objective of great importance to society.
67 Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1924)
upheld the validity of the presumptions in both the
Jones-Miller and Harrison Acts. The latter presumption
was also sustained in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S.
413, 13 CoRN. L. Q. 627 (1928); the former in Charley
Toy v. United States, 266 Fed. 326 (2d Cir. 1920);
Copperthwaite v. United States, supra n. 28; Caudillo
v. United States, supra n. 53.
The court in Casey, supra, also upheld the Harrison
Act provision that possession was prima facie evidence
clusion is that, when a rational connection exists
between the fact proved and those presumed,"s
the federal jurisdictional facts, i.e. unlawful
importation and knowledge, can be established
by circumstantial evidence."' Since the presump-
tion is not conclusive,70 Congress has not exceeded
the bounds of its. authority by declaring mere
possession to be criminal n There is no violation
of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination,
for assuming the aforementioned rational con-
nection, he is no more compelled to testify than he
would be in the absence of the presumption and
the presence of a circumstantial prima facie case.
72
Notwithstanding that the general failure of re-
buttals based on independent evidence" may
create an actual compulsion for the accused to
testify, this result is not clearly traceable to the
presumption. 74 Nor is there an infringement of the
presumption of innocence since that presumption
may be overcome by circumstantial evidence."
There is no curtailment of the jury trial guaran-
tee, for judicial or legislative authorization to
convict, like an instruction on the burden of proof,
still permits the jury to make the ultimate deci-
sionY1 Finally, careful instruction to the jury of
of a purchase within the jurisdiction, thus establishing
the venue of the federal court. See also 18 U.S.C.,
§3237, laying venue wherever the unlawful act was be-
gun, completed or continued.
68 To meet this standard, the fact proved must render
the inference more probable than not, rather than
merely tend to prove the fact to be established.
McCoasncx, supra n. 55, sec. 313, p. 660.
69 See Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory
Presumptions, supra n. 35 at 548. The roots of the ra-
tional connection test can be found in Mobile, J. &
K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910):
"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evi-
dence of another may not constitute a denial of due
process of law or a denial of the equal protection of
the law, it is only essential that there shall be some
rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of
one fact from proof of another shall not be so un-
reasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate."
See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), finding
no such connection between possession and illegal use
of firearms.
70 Cf. n. 44, supra.
71 See n. 25, supra.
72 Yee Hem v. United States, supra n. 67 at 185;
McCopmcx, supra n. 55, sec. 313, p. 662. In many
cases, rebuttal may consist of independent expert tes-
timony that the narcotics in question were similar to
those domestically produced and circumstantial evi-
dence of defendant's lack of knowledge, i.e. casual con-
nection with the transaction. Cf. Caudillo v. United
States, supra n. 53. Thus defendant need not testify at
all, though in some such situations he could truthfully
testify without incriminating himself.
71 See, e.g. United States v. Norton, supra n. 57.
74 McCopmscx, supra n. 55, sec. 313, p. 662.
75 Yee Hem v. United States, supra n. 67 at 184-85.
76 McCoMCxK, supra n. 55, sec. 313, p. 662. For a
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the existence of the presumption17 is not objection-
able as a forbidden comment on the weight of the
evidence.78
Courts have unanimously found a rational
connection between the fact of possession and both
unlawful importation and knowledge because the
narcotics laws so severely limit the amount in cir-
culation.7
Perhaps with a view toward denials of a rational
connection between possession and unlawful
importation 0 or scienter,s ' commentators have
suggested broader tests of constitutionality. The
''comparative convenience" test is based upon the
policy decision that it is not unfair or without the
bounds of due process to compel the accused to
present evidence, i.e. of source and scienter, which
is clearly more accessible to him when the imposi-
tion of that burden on the government would be
obstructive of a successful prosecution.P It is
uncertain, however, that this argument is sound
inasmuch as so many defendants, i.e. intermediaries
or casual facilitators, have neither greater knowl-
edge of the source of the narcotics nor access to
such information than the prosecution; moreover,
the government may still prove these elements
circumstantially.
The "greater includes the lesser" offense test s'
summary dismissal of the unusual argument that the
presumption constituted an unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the jury, see Stein v. United States,
166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844
(1948). This argument appears untenable in view of
(1) the lack of express prohibition against a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, (2) the judicial alternative
of disclaiming the operative fact of possession as a
matter of law, and (3) the traditional view that the
jury should weigh the evidence. Although judges may
be more logical, the inferences in question are so inter-
related to the facts found, that judicial appraisal of
circumstantial evidence is no more desirable than in
the case of direct evidence.
77 That some instruction is necessary, see n. 41, supra.
78 Brosman, The Statutory Presumption, 5 TuL. L.
REV. 178, 201 (1931).
79 See Yee Hem v, United States, supra n. 67 at 184,
to the effect that legitimate possession of opium is so
rare that persons in possession are bound to know the
restrictions on its importation and handle it at their
peril. Moreover, judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that unlike opium, heroin and marihuana are not
used for scientific purposes. See Caudillo v. United
States, supra n. 53 at 547; Copperthwaite v. United
States, 37 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1930).
80 See the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice McRey-
nolds and Mr. Justice Butler in Casey v. United States,
supra n. 67 at 421, 426-427.
8140 TEx. L. REV. 287 (1961).
82 Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Pre-
sumptions, 55 COL. L. REV. 527, 533-34 (1955); Bros-
man, supra n. 78 at 181.
8 See n. 25, supra.
is here inapplicable because Congress has no power
to punish upon proof of the operative factN hence
it cannot exercise legislative grace by permitting
the accused to exculpate himself by rebutting the
presumption. Although Wigmore has attacked the
rational connection requirement as improper
judicial interference with legislative discretion,85
and McCormick would sustain a statutory pre-
sumption on either of the three foregoing tests,
86
the broad influence of the instant presumption,
as manifested by the difficulty of rebuttal, seems
to require, at least, the safeguard provided by the
rational connection requirement.87
IV. THE OPERATIvE FACT
Implementation of this safeguard cannot be
achieved on a general plane because there ob-
viously is a rational connection between possession
on the one hand, and unlawful importation and
scienter, as judicially construed,3 on the other.
Also, if defendants are to be protected at all, it
must be before the presumption becomes operative;
beyond that point they are at the mercy of a jury
conditioned by the presumption. This would sug-
gest careful judicial definition of the operative
fact, possession, as well as dose scrutiny of the
rational connection in each case. Reasonable
inferences, both of unlawful importation and
knowledge thereof, drawn from the circumstances
should be prerequisite to a finding of possession.9
Since possession is not an essential element of
the crime, convictions may be supported by in-
dependent evidence, direct or circumstantial, 9° of
84 Note, Constitutionality of Rebuttable Statutory Pre-
sumptions, supra n. 82 at 533-34, 544; If the legislature
could have imposed liability upon proof of a fact, de-
fendant is certainly not prejudiced by its use in a rebut-
table presumption. See Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88
(1928).
88 VIOaORE, EVMENCE, § 1356, pp. 1063 et seq. (2d
ed. 1923).
86 MCCORMCK, supra n. 55, sec. 313, p. 663.
87 See Brosman, supra n. 78 at 187.
88 See notes 61-64, supra and accompanying text.
89 The closest judicial statement to this effect is by
Kaufman, J., dissenting in United States v. Gregory,
309 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, Sumpter
v. United States, 373 U.S. 953 (1963):
"Where the possession is so fleeting and where the
ability to control is so tenuous that it is unreasonable
to deduce knowledge therefrom, then the shifting of
the burden of proof to the defendant is improper."
98 Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311 (9th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 889 (1961):
"That the narcotic drug is that type which is pro-
hibited can be proved (a) by testimony relating to
the substance itself, such as color analysis, etc., or
(b) by testimony as to the surrounding circum-
stances, or (c) by reliance on the statutory presump-
tion arising from proof of possession."
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participation in the prescribed act, unlawful
importation and knowledge thereof.9' Nor does
actual possession, in the ordinary sense of the word,
automatically activate the presumption; posses-
sion must be consciousn and of sufficient duration
to manifest control over the narcotics,93 so that the
facts to be presumed may be reasonably inferred 4
Likewise, the presumption may become operative
without any showing of actual physical possession,
when the accused has such dominion and control
as to insure his power of disposal.95 However, al-
91Pon Wing Quong v. United States, 111 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1940).
" Compare Perez v. United States, 297 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1961) (dictum to the effect that in order to activate
presumption, prosecution must prove that defendant
was aware of presence of marihuana grains in his trouser
cuffs) with Espinoza v. United States, 317 F.2d 275
(9th Cir. 1963) (defendant who transported heroin in
two rubber condoms held to have burden of establish-
ing ignorance of contents, though circumstantial evi-
dence, e.g. of outer wrapping and casual participation,
might sustain this burden.)
The second and seventh circuits have apparently
followed Espinoza in treating knowledge of possession
of narcotics as knowledge of unlawful importation,
hence part of defendant's burden of rebuttal. See United
States v. Barrington, 291 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1961);
United States v. Kapsalis, 313 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 856 (1963). This view seems justi-
fied on the ground that knowledge is a fact peculiarly
within defendant's control and testimonial proof may
be aided by circumstantial evidence.
3 In United States v. Santore, 290 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 834 (1961), defendant
Narducci's conviction was reversed because his grasp of
a package of narcotics in an automobile trunk had been
momentary before he dropped it upon spying federal
agents. United States v. Barrington, supra n. 92, dis-
tinguished Santore on the ground that momentary pos-
session was accompanied by other incriminating circum-
stances, i.e. defendant's addiction, past participation in
narcotics transaction, and use of narcotics jargon in
reference to the package in his possession. In United
States v. Gregory, supra n. 89, defendant Sumpter's
conviction was affirmed although his only contact with
the narcotics was to receive the package from his auto-
mobile companion and immediately dispose of it
through the window, because the court found his action
motivated by his recognition of approaching federal
agents.
Santore may be criticized for failing to properly eval-
uate the incriminating circumstance of Narducci's im-
mediate disposal of the package. Would one without
knowledge of the contraband nature of the package have
acted so suspiciously? Gregory seems justified on the
grounds that if the accused had recognized the officers,
his actions manifested guilty knowledge; if his disposal
of the package were the innocent act of an agent di-
rected by his principal, he could have so testified. As
in the case of joint tortfeasors, such allocation of re-
sponsibility is much more readily shown by the defense.
14 See n. 89 supra, and accompanying text.95Hernandez v. United States, 300 F.2d 114 (9th
Cir. 1962). Such "constructive possession" applies to a
defendant who has sufficient dominion and control over
the narcotics to direct their possession. This doctrine is
though proof of dominion and control over prop-
erty on which narcotics are found is a strong
circumstance tending to prove constructive pos-
session, mere ownership of such property, es-
pecially when another has more immediate pos-
session,96 or mere proximity to the drug or associa-
tion with one who controls the property on which
it is found,w is insufficient.
It is obvious from the foregoing discusssion that
circumstantial evidence, i.e., other incriminating
circumstances, is useful in determining when it is
reasonable to ask the accused to explain his
possession. Circumstantial evidence may also
prove the fact of actual" or constructive" pos-
session. The availability of such evidence may
justified by a judicial imputation to Congress of an
intention to "avoid freeing the principal who does not
have manual possession while punishing the agent who
does." Id. at 118. Such principals are more likely to
have the capacity to explain the source of the narcotics
than the agents in possession.
96 Jackson v. United States, 250 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir.
1957). (conviction reversed when only proof of posses-
sion was defendant's possession of key to his nephew's
room in which narcotics were found hidden in a televi-
sion set).
Cf. United States v. Landry, 257 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1958), reversing a conviction when defendant merely
claimed ownership of heroin found in actual possession
of another. Although Congress has indeed made "pos-
session" and not "ownership" the operative fact, this
decision seems somewhat inconsistent with the "con-
structive possession" rationale which seeks to punish
the principal who has actual control rather than the
agent. Any justification derived from the fact that the
physical possessor may explain his possession by mere
reference to the owner is weakened by the improbability
that such explanation will be accepted as exculpatory.
See, e.g. United States v. Norton, 310 F.2d 718 (2d Cir.
1962), and n. 44, supra.
9 Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603 (9th Cir.
1962) (though possession may be joint and need not be
exclusive, wife held not to have constructive possession
over husband's narcotics).
98 Medrano v. United States, 315 F.2d 361 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 854 (1964), citing Cellino v.
United States, 276 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1960).
The best circumstantial evidence of actual possession
is fingerprint evidence. Stoppelli v. United States, 183
F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 854
(1964). See also United States v. Chiarelli, 192 F.2d
528 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952);
United States v. Pisano, 193 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1951).
Although such evidence is reliable as to the fact that
the accused touched the package, it becomes less reliable
in view of the facts that the package may have con-
tained a different substance at the time of contact, and
defendant is likely to have more difficulty recalling
when and why he made contact than if he were caught
in actual possession.
1 White v. United States, 315 F.2d 113 (9th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 821 (1964), citing Rodella
v. United States, 286 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1960); United
States v. Malfi, 264 F.2d 147 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. de-
nied, 361 U.S. 817 (1959).
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permit the government to use trained anonymous
informers,1 0 though some limitations on this
practice are necessary to insure the accused a fair
opportunity to rebut the presumption.'
0'
Although the propriety of this use of circum-
stantial evidence to prove the operative fact of a
statutory presumption has been attacked as basing
an inference on an inference, 02 this criticism is
relevant only if circumstantial evidence is in-
herently less reliable than direct evidence. 02 The
latter proposition is countered by the ordinary
difficulties, e.g., honesty and memory of wit-
nesses, intrinsic to the direct evidence method of
proof. 0 4 For the same reason, the circumstantial
evidence test for appellate review of the sufficiency
of the evidence, which requires that all circum-
stances be consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence, has
been replaced in some federal courts by the tradi-
tional substantial evidence test.'
0 5
The functional significance of the permissibility
of proving actual possession by means of circum-
stantial evidence has been somewhat overshadowed
100 See, e.g., Dear Check Quong v. United States, 160
F.2d 251 (D.C.Cir. 1947), in which the testimony of an
informer who purchased narcotics from defendant was
unnecessary because the informer was searched imme-
diately before and after the transaction and the officers
could testify as to the exchange of narcotics for govern-
ment funds and sole contact during the period of ex-
change with the accused. No explanation of the posses-
sion so proved was attempted.
101 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1956) held
that the government must, if requested, disclose the
identity of undercover informers who participated in
proving possession:
"The fact that petitioner here was faced with the
burden of explaining or justifying his alleged posses-
sion of the heroin emphasizes his vital need for ac-
cess to any material witness. Otherwise the burden
of going forvard might become unduly heavy. Id.
at 63.
102 See Note, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in
a Criminal Case, 55 CoL. L. REv. 549, 551 (1955) and
cases cited therein. Cf. n. 76, supra. See also, Rodeila v.
United States, supra n. 99, at 312, n. 4:
"It is not basing a presumption on an inference be-
cause the proof of possession, whether actual or
constructive, calls for a reasoned conclusion of the
trier of fact-based on factual evidence in either
case.
103 Note, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in a
Criminal Case, supra n. 102 at 555.
'o4 Id. at 557. See 3 WHARTON, CRImnAL EViDENCE,
p. 472 (12th ed. 1955): "As a legal matter, there is no
distinction between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence."
105 See Note, Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence in
a Criminal Case, supra n. 102 at 549, and cases cited
therein. See also Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121
(1954), finding a jury charge in reasonable hypothesis
terms unnecessary, and even undesirable.
by the doctrine of constructive possession. Based
as it is on the judicial implementation of an im-
puted legislative purpose to punish the leaders of
criminal operations, 0 6 the doctrine compels the
conclusion not only that possession need neither
be immediate nor exclusive. 0 7 but also that actual
physical custody is not required. 10 The problem
remains, however, of an ad hoc definition of
"dominion and control" in order that the accused
may have a fair opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption 02
The factors which generally indicate such con-
trol are (1) active negotiation in the transaction;
(2) power to determine (a) the quantity and (b)
the price of the narcotics; (3) power to direct (a)
delivery or locus of the drug and (b) method of
payment; (4) apparent intimacy of contact with
the illicit traffic as manifested by assurances of
(a) quality of the drug, (b) reliability of other
parties to the transaction, (c) previous partici-
pation, or (d) future intention to participate;
(5) apparent stake in the venture as manifested by
(a) receipt of or (b) control over, the proceeds.
Findings of constructive possession have invariably
resulted from a combination of these factors.
10
106 Hernandez v. United States, supra n. 95 at 116-17.
See generally n. 95, supra. But see the opinion of L.
Hand, J., concurring and dissenting in United States v.
Santore, supra n. 93 at 70-71, attacking this statutory
construction. True, Congress could have expressly in-
cluded constructive possession as an operative fact; yet
it seems unlikely that it would choose to castigate the
"tools" rather than the "minds" of criminal activity.
The legislative history is unrevealing. See also 110 U.
PA. L. REv. 903, 907-08 (1962).
107 Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293 (9th Cir.
1955). See n. 97, supra.
100 It should be noted that one in constructive pos-
session has the power to determine physical custody
and could, at any time, have been in actual possession.
See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 277 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1960) where the finding of possession sufficient to ac-
tivate the presumption was based on the defendant's
negotiations with the purchaser/federal agent and his
direction to the cache of narcotics. Defendant might
have placed the package himself or directed another to
do so.
Cf. REsTATEmENT, TORTS § 216, similarly defining
possession of chattels in terms of control. This section
was cited in Roddla v. United Stales, supra n. 90 at 312.
10' See 110 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 907 (1962).
00 See, e.g. United States v. Moia, 251 F.2d 255 (2d
Cir. 1958) (defendant set price and terms of delivery);
United States v. Ladson, 294 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 824 (1962) (defendant set terms
of payment and delivery, and received proceeds);
United States v. Countryman, 311 F.2d 189 (2d Cir.
1962) (defendant directed delivery and received pro-
ceeds); United States v. Ramis, 315 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.
1963) (defendant set terms of sale and delivery, vouched
for quality of narcotics and solicited future sales);
Knapp v. United States, 311 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1962),
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Some however, such as (2), capacity to set the
terms of the transaction, (4) (a), capacity to assure
the quality of the drug, and (5) (b), ultimate
custody of the proceeds, are especially significant,
because they are generally associated with the
principals of the enterprise."' With the doctrinal
objectivein and the problems arising from or-
ganized criminal enterprise, 13 dearly in focus, the
Second Circuit has, in United States v. Hernandez,'"
adopted a test of constructive possession which
requires that the accused have such a relationship
with one having physical custody of the narcotics
as to be able to assure their delivery as a matter of
course." 5 This test thus liberates from the statu-
tory burden of explanation those casual facilitators
whose association with the criminal enterprise is
so tenuous that they may have no knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the source of the nar-
cotics."6 It also appears to codify the afore-
mentioned factors of constructive possession as
relevant both to the power of the accused to pro-
duce the drugs and the degree of facility with
which he can do so. 7
rehearing denied 316 F.2d 794 (1963) (defendant knew
locus of narcotics and ultimately disposed of proceeds
in joint bank account which he shared with partner
who had physical possession of the drugs); Lucero v.
United States, 311 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1962) (defendant
negotiated sale, set price, and vouched for the quality
of the drug); Cdlino v. United States, supra n. 98 (de-
fendant introduced buydr and seller and vouched for
the latter's reliability).
But see United States v. Jones, 308 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.
1962) reversing a finding of constructive possession
when the accused merely introduced the contracting
parties and received payment for such service as an
intermediary; he was expressly to be excluded from
future transactions.
"'Thus, Cellino, supra n. 98, may be criticized as
ensnaring a mere casual facilitator. 110 U. PA. L. REv.
903, 907 (1962). The accused therein was no more ac-
tively involved than the defendant in Jones, supra n.
110 for purposes of activating the presumption. The
attempted distinction on the ground that the former
defendant had warranted the seller's reliability fails
because of the lack of rational connection of this fact
to illegal source of the drugs and scienter. Any agent,
ignorant of the source, could praise his principal. Per-
haps for this reason the second circuit indicated its
readiness to stray from Cellino if necessary. Id. at 30,
n. 2.
112 See text accompanying n. 109, supra.
"' Difficulties inhere, not when the transaction in-
volves only one potential defendant, but where there
are principals, agents, and casual facilitators.
"1 290 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1961).
's Id. at 90.
116 See 31 FoRD. L. PEv. 821, 823 (1963).
"
7 The results in the cases cited in n. 110, supra gen-
erally are preserved. Cellino, supra n. 98, and Lu-
cero, supra n. 110, are possible exceptions since neither
defendant had the power to produce narcotics as a
matter of course. The latter case can be so read only if
Another interesting problem is presented when
the accused is a participant in a transaction in
which another has actual or constructive possession
of the narcotics. Since conspirators are criminally
liable for all acts within the common purpose of the
conspiracy,"' and aiders and abettors are treated
not as facilitators, but under a separate statute,S
it has been stated that the possession of one party
may be attributed to the conspirator, aider or
abettor,"' in order to activate the presumption.
Although this proposition has received some
judicial approval, it has never been accepted as the
sole basis for decision."' The Second Circuit was
evenly divided on this question in United States vs.
Santore,m but has ultimately required independ-
ent proof of possession in order to activate the
presumption against an aider and abettor in United
States v. Jones.m The Ninth Circuit had reached
the finding of the dissent that defendant acted on the
orders of another, is accepted.
ns See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.
1938).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 2 punishes aiders and abettors as
principals. 21 U.S.C. § 174 similarly treats facilita-
tors.
'0 United States v. Cohen, 124 F.2d 164, 165 (2d
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, Bernstein v. United States, 315
U.S. 811 (1942). This assertion may be regarded as
dictum since there was evidence of both actual and
constructive possession. Cellino v. United States, supra
n. 110, distinguished Cohen on this ground.
m1 See, e.g., United States v. Chiarelli, 192 F.2d 528
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952); United
States v. Maroy, 248 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1957); Alex-
ander v. United States, 241 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 940 (1957); United States v.
Moia, 251 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1958). In every case there
was sufficient evidence of either actual or constructive
possession.
m Supra n. 93. Santore's conviction was on alterna-
tive grounds since he had knowledge of his colleague's
possession and could probably produce narcotics as a
matter of course, thus justifying an independent finding
of constructive possession. Lumbard, C. J., with Moore
and Smith, J. J., argued that although 21 U.S.C. §
174 would require proof of possession for activation of
the presumption against a facilitator, 18 U.S.C. § 2
required an aider and abettor to have mere
knowledge of another's possession in order that posses-
sion may be attributed to him for presumption purposes.
This was consistent with the legislative purpose since
it was as reasonable to expect those without custody of
the drug to be able to explain its source as those in
possession. Id. at 77-78. Waterman, Friendly and
Clark, J. 3. found no basis for distinguishing between a
facilitator and aider and abettor. Id. at 80, n. 1. They
also found the reasoning by which the essential scienter
was proved by showing mere knowledge of possession
of another to be circuitous and totally unwarranted by
reasonable inferences. Id. at 80-82.
See also 110 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 906 (1962); 31
FoRD. L. REv. 821, 824 (1963).
in Supra n. 110. See also United States v. Hernandez,
supra n. 114; United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400
1966]
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the same conclusion in Hernandez v. United
States,124 on the strength of reasoning suggested in
Santore12 5 to the effect that the scienter required of
a principal 26 who is an aider and abettor may not
be proved by attribution of possession, for that
would presume the fact to be proved, i.e., that he
was an aider and abettor."' Moreover, the theory
behind the presumption contradicts such an
attribution, for an aider and abettor is not only not
the party best able to explain the source of the
narcotics, but he would, in addition, be required to
justify the possession of another."8 A defendant
might even be convicted as an aider and abettor
to the commission of a substantive offense when no
such offense had in fact been committed for the
absent principal in possession might be able to
satisfy the jury."8 Finally, requiring a casual
participant to explain another's possession would
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 53 (1962). The
argument follows from Santore, supra n. 110, and Her-
nandez v. United States, infra n. 124.
11 300 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1962). See also Ceilino v.
United States, supra n. 98.
"I See n. 119, supra.
16 Supra n. 93 at 80-82.
127 Hernandez v. United States, supra n. 124 at 123.
The court also noted: "It would be anomalous indeed if
proof of a common scheme or plan, admittedly insuffi-
cient to constitute a conspiracy violative of sec. 174
because proof of the requisite specific knowledge was
lacking, could nonetheless provide the basis for im-
puting the same specific knowledge for the purposes of
conviction of the substantive offenses under the same
statute." Id. at 121.
See also 31 Fore. L. REV. 821, 824 (1963); 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 903, 906 (1962).
128 United States v. Jones, supra n. 110 at 33; 31
FoRn. L. REv. 824, 825 (1963).
"8 Hernandez v. United States, supra n. 124 at 123-
24; United States v. Jones, supra n. 110 at 33.
frequently impose an impossible burden,"30
permitting the jury to infer guilt from, not even
possession, but mere association with a criminal
enterprise. The necessity for proof of the facts on
which federal jurisdiction is based would then be
obviated and the constitutional limitations ig-
nored. 31
V. CONCLUSION
Although the statutory presumption as a rule of
evidence merely regularizes reasonable inferences
drawn from the circumstances of narcotics trans-
actions, it has great practical value in federal
prosecutions. The broad discretion lodged in the
jury with legislative authorization to convict upon
a finding of possession, may, if unrestricted by the
rational connection requirement, result in the
unauthorized creation of a federal crime of pos-
session. However, since the general validity of the
presumption is well-settled, and the legislative
delegation to the jury is dear, judicial controls
must be exerted by ad hoc review of the presence
of the operative fact, possession. Consistent with
the imputed legislative intent, the presumption
should be activated only against a defendant when
the circumstances indicate that he either knows or
has willfully ignored the source of the narcotics.
This theoretical objective should determine the
limits of the doctrine of constructive possession.
It should also serve as a point of reference in the
resolution of all criminal problems arising under the
presumption.
130 Cf. n. 44, supra.
"' Hernandez v. United States, supra n. 124 at 121.
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